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ABSTRACT
Traditionally, regional mass media has been the least-studied
component of the Russian media system; however, beginning
from the 2000s, transformations in the nation’s political and
economic spheres have inﬂuenced the position of local media. This
paper provides a deeper investigation of the processes and
patterns underlying the development of regional mass media in
modern Russia. The research is grounded on an analytical review
of secondary sources, which is supported by 14 in-depth
interviews with media professionals from 5 regions in Russia. The
results reveal that Russia’s regional media outlets operate both as
commercial actors and public service actors. This duality is rooted
in several multidirectional and controversial changes in the
nation’s economic and political systems, as well as in a journalist
culture which causes media outlets to have a vague understanding
of their places and functions in society.
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Introduction
Compared to big media outlets, regional and local media are not trendy topics,
especially in academic literature. Local media typically occupies a weaker position in a
country’s media system due to its many challenges, such as lower quality of journalism,
poor economic conditions and lack of technological development (Currah, 2009; Nielsen,
2015). However, scholars argue that local media and journalism deserve more attention.
As Kleis Nielsen explained, local journalism ‘provides information about local public
aﬀairs, it holds local elites at least somewhat accountable, it provides a forum for
discussion, and ties communities together’ (Nielsen, 2015, p. 1). However, two questions
emerge: How relevant is this statement to local journalism in non-Western media
systems such as Russia’s? What are the actual roles of regional mass media in
modern Russia?
Existing research on Russia’s regional media primarily cover the ﬁrst 1.5 decades of the
post-Soviet period (1990s–mid-2000s). This period created new political and economic
conditions which catalysed fundamental changes in the country’s media system, including
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
CONTACT Olga Dovbysh dovbysh@hse.ru Department of Media, National Research University – Higher School of
Economics, 2/8 Khitrovsky Pereulok, Building 5, 109028, Moscow, Russia.
RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION
2019, VOL. 11, NO. 1, 71–87
https://doi.org/10.1080/19409419.2019.1572532
the ﬁnancing models of media outlets, the professional norms and values of journalists,
and state–media relations.1 Regional media also underwent major transformations
during this time. The short period of media independence at the beginning, which
granted media outlets with the power to act as a ‘fourth branch of government’ (1990–
1992), was replaced by a period of harsh economic conditions in which regional media
relied on barter deals for advertising space or electoral cash to keep their outlets aﬂoat
(Roudakova, 2017). Starting from the mid-1990s, new local elites, represented by ‘cross-
institutional groups’,2 sought to establish control over regional media outlets which
were perceived as key resources in the struggle for power. Informational wars between
these groups are considered to have instrumentalized Russia’s regional media and the
‘selling out’ of their independence (Koltsova, 2006; Roudakova, 2009). Beginning in the
2000s, these intra-elite struggles were replaced by the centralization of political control
via the Kremlin’s direct appointment of regional governors.3 Cross-institutional groups,
which lost their political ambitions, no longer seemed to need media outlets.
The latest period in the history of Russia’s regional media is characterized by clientelist
relations with regional authorities (Lowrey & Erzikova, 2010) and new ﬁnancing sources,
such as state informational contracts (Dovbysh & Gudova, 2016). This period is much
less studied than previous ones; however, one can suggest that recent changes in the pol-
itical system, ﬁnancing models and professional culture of regional journalists led to a
transformation of the very nature of regional media outlets. The coexistence of clientelist
relations with regional authorities, commercial goals to maximize proﬁtability, professional
cynicism, and the intention to provide public-oriented content placed regional media in a
controversial position.
The present article investigates recent transformations in Russia’s regional mass media
starting from the 2000s and ending in 2018, as well as the inﬂuence these changes had on
the positions and roles of media outlets in regions. An analysis of the political, economic
and cultural factors which shaped the current position of regional mass media is sup-
ported by 14 in-depth interviews with media professionals in 5 regions of Russia, revealing
the controversial nature of media which combines market- and public-oriented logic.
Due to the absence of public service broadcasting in the country, the idea of public
service is not often applied to Russian media (Vartanova, 2012). Nevertheless, particularly
for local media, the notion of public service is seen as opposite to the commercial logic of
mass media.4 In analysing Russia’s regional media, I do not address public service broad-
casting (i.e. a practical embodiment of public service) but a more general idea of public
interest5 that public-oriented media tends to pursue. Public interest is not synonymous
with the interests of the audience; rather, it implies a responsibility to support the
norms, ethics and values of a society through informational diversity and representation
of various social groups and communities, including those which are small and underpri-
vileged (McQuail, 2010; Rozanova, 2007). In this sense, I understand public service as the
ability to create a ‘communicational condition of democracy characterized by [the]
informed and responsible engagement of citizens in public debates under conditions of
separation and [the] balance of power’ (Rozanova, 2007, p. 142).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section describes the
current state of aﬀairs of Russia’s regional mass media. Following this, I analyse the
most inﬂuential changes which aﬀect the current nature of this media. My analysis of sec-
ondary sources is supported by interview data collected from local media professionals. I
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then discuss the controversial nature of regional mass media in modern Russia. The article
closes with several conclusions.
Russia’s regional media system
How is regional media deﬁned? Are there any diﬀerences between regional and local
media? Western authors often use ‘regional’ and ‘local’media interchangeably, suggesting
that they are generic terms, opposed to national media (Cheng, 2005; Franklin & Murphy,
2005). At the same time, the local scale is quite ﬂexible and may refer to ‘a neighbourhood,
town, county, metropolitan area, or region’ (Cheng, 2005, p. 143). In Russian-language
studies, however, the term regionalnie SMI (‘regional mass media’) is more common, refer-
ring to non-national media which operates within the boundaries of a particular region.6
Another term, lokalnie SMI (‘local media’), usually describes the media of smaller territories,
such as districts or cities; however, this term is much rarer in discussions of Russian media.7
Besides this place-oriented approach to local media, there is a people-oriented
approach. In this approach, some groups of people can be excluded from the target audi-
ence of local news outlets, despite living in the same geographical area (Poindexter, Smith,
& Heider, 2003). In the present article, I rely on the place-oriented approach and thus
deﬁne regional mass media as media which operates at the regional level of Russia’s
media system, meaning that it is based in one of Russia’s 85 regions, focuses on regional
news agendas, and consumed mainly by the residents of these regions.8 Media outlets
with smaller than regional coverage, if not separately speciﬁed, are also included in this
category. I use the terms ‘local journalists’ and ‘local media professionals’ to refer to
those who work in local mass media.
According to Roskomnadzor,9 there were 80,134 registered media outlets in Russia in
2017 (Mass media in Russia in, 2017, 2018), around 31,000 of which were registered in a
particular region;10 however, these ﬁgures only consider registration status, not whether
they are active. Therefore, there is no reliable data on the number of regional newspapers,
radio stations and other types of mass media that are currently in operation.
Regional media is an important source of information for the Russian public. According
to surveys conducted in 2017, 83% of Russians get information11 from regional TV (35%
= ‘often’, 48% = ‘seldom’), 70% from regional newspapers (24% = ‘often’, 46% = ‘seldom’),
49% from regional radio (16% = ‘often’, 33% = ‘seldom’) (WCIOM [All-Russian Public
Opinion Research Center], 2017). The popularity of regional media increases depending
on the region’s remoteness from Moscow: only 33% of Russians living in the Central
Federal District watch regional TV regularly, but this ﬁgure increases to 53% in the Far
Federal District (‘Strana Online’, 2017). Nevertheless, consumption of regional media is
much lower than that of national media. Mediascope12 reported a decrease in viewership
from 4.1% in 2014 to 3.7% in 2015, then to 3.4% in 2016 (Television in Russia in, 2016, 2017).
For national TV channels such as Perviy Kanal (‘First Channel’) or Rossiya 1 (‘Russia 1’),
typical viewership ranges between 12.1–13.2% (Mediascope spotted the most popular
Russian TV channel, 2018). However, the level of trust in Russia’s local media is still high:
65% of Russians trust local TV, 44% trust local press and 36% trust local radio (TV, Internet,
newspapers, radio: Trust but check, 2016). According to Foundation Mediastandart (http://
www.msindex.ru/, 2017), trust in local mass media is even higher than trust in national
mass media. These statistics demonstrate that even though regional mass media is less
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visible than its national counterpart and are not the ﬁrst choice of the Russian public, it is
still considered an important and reliable source of information.
Regional media outlets represent a very heterogeneous group. As noted in previous
research, the locality of media is quite ﬂexible (Cheng, 2005). Within Russia’s regional
media, I have observed three levels of locality:
(1) Mass media with all-region coverage. Every region in Russia has at least one all-region
TV channel (a branch of VGTRK [The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting
Company]), but usually there are another 1–2 TV channels, 1–2 radio channels and
several newspapers all distributed across the region.
(2) Mass media with district (rayon)13 coverage. District media typically includes newspa-
pers and online media, but some districts also have audio–visual media (e.g. TV and
radio).
(3) Media that covers cities (urban media) and smaller settlements. Urban media outlets
are more commonly based in regional capitals and other big cities, due to the greater
availability of resources in these areas.
Regional media can also be categorized according to the type of owner or founder. This
level of diﬀerentiation is important because it inﬂuences the targets, goals, missions and edi-
torial policies of media outlets. The following types of owners have been observed: federal
authorities, regional authorities, municipal authorities and private owners (i.e. companies
and/or individuals). Federal authorities are comprised mainly of the regional branches of
the VGTRK. Regional authorities own diﬀerent media assets, from TV channels to online
media; in mid-2000s, through the creation of ‘governor’s TV channels’, the share of regional
governments in regional media capital increased in many regions (Vyrkovskiy & Makeenko,
2014). Private owners are very diverse, ranging from big industrial groups headquartered in
Moscow (e.g. the regional network of Hearst Shkulev Digital) to local individuals and
businesses. These owners may be based in the same region or in another region.
Recent research has demonstrated that the organizational forms of regional media outlets
do not have much of an eﬀect on their operation (Dovbysh & Gudova, 2016). Mass media
operating in the form of a joint stock company may be owned by regional authorities and
receive signiﬁcant ﬁnancial support from local budgets.14 Likewise, state-owned media
outlets can act as commercial companies and rely on market sources of income. Therefore,
this reveals that ﬁnancing models are another important feature of Russia’s regional media
(Vyrkovskiy & Makeenko, 2014). Three main ﬁnancing models have been identiﬁed in the lit-
erature, according to their level of proﬁtability (i.e. from extremely low or negative proﬁtability
to high [10–13%] proﬁtability) and shares of state versus commercial sources of income.
These classiﬁcations demonstrate a predicament of Russia’s regional media, in which
the ownership structure does not inﬂuence the outlets’ ﬁnancing models and proﬁtability,
nor does it reﬂect the company’s stability in the market. This predicament was brought
about by changes in the regional media system occurring in the 2000s.
Recent changes in Russia’s regional media system
Previous research had a strong focus on analysing media–political relations as the main
explanatory factor which shaped the regional media landscape of Russia. However,
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political inﬂuence always goes hand-in-hand with economic factors (Erzikova & Lowrey,
2014, 2017). The professional culture of local journalists is considered another important
element of Russia’s regional media (Pasti & Pietiläinen, 2008; Roudakova, 2017). In the
present research, I view all three elements (i.e. politics, economics and professional
culture) as tightly intertwined, thus imbuing current transformations in regional media
with a multicausal nature. Moreover, not only visible factors (i.e. media–political relations)
but also implicit factors (i.e. culture) may have a signiﬁcant impact.
To study these multicausal transformations, I selected a six-area analytical framework
developed by Toepﬂ (2013), who earlier used it to compare media changes in Russia
and the Czech Republic. The framework has the following structure. The ﬁrst three
areas (i.e. journalist culture, political system and economic system) form the central,
inter-related elements which shape the Russian media system. Together with the last
three areas (i.e. media-related beliefs among citizens, socio-economic development and
other external factors), the framework highlights an epistemological premise: complex
processes at the macro level, such as changes in the media system, are considered a
result of various interactions between factors at the lower levels (Toepﬂ, 2013).
In the following subsections, I discuss how I adjusted this framework to suit the pur-
poses of the present research. I analyse the dimensions of Russia’s regional media devel-
opment and the three central, inter-related areas. Descriptions of the last three areas are
embedded within the discussions of the corresponding central areas: socio-economic
development and external factors in the section on economic system, and citizen’s
media-related beliefs in the section on journalist culture.
Economic system
Today, Russia’s regional media outlets face harsh economic conditions and rely on state
ﬁnancing, both industry and state representatives argue (Council Under the President,
2016; Kasyutin, 2011a, 2011b). At least two of the reasons behind this dependency can
be explained by economic factors.
First, the majority of regional advertising markets are still unable to provide enough
ﬁnancing for all the media outlets in a region. The size of an advertising market is strongly
correlated with the country’s GDP (Gross Domestic Product) (Aris & Bughin, 2005). Total
advertising expenditures and advertising expenditures per capita are still much lower in
post-Soviet countries than in Western Europe and the USA.15 It is also important to note
the socio-economic inequalities that exist between Russia’s regions, which lead to dispro-
portions within the regional media system. For instance, the highest region’s GDP rate (in
Moscow) is 330 times greater than the lowest one (in Altai Republic). Regional media also
diﬀers according to characteristics dependent on socio-economic development (e.g.
number of media outlets, capacities of advertising markets, and audience characteristics).
The other important diﬀerence is that, as a rule, the majority of a region’s advertising
budget is concentrated in the capital city of that region.
Second, the disproportions between national and regional advertising markets cause a
signiﬁcant share of the regional advertising to be distributed by a central media seller in
Moscow, not in a regional distributor.16 This happens when local advertisers buy advertis-
ing facilities not only in local media outlets but also in national media outlets (e.g. when
national TV channels purchase geo-targeted advertising spots). National media outlets sell
their advertising facilities from a single media seller, Region Media, located in Moscow.
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Since TV advertising is the most expensive, approximately 50% of the available ﬁnancing
ﬂows away from local media outlets to media corporations with national broadcasting
capabilities.
Lack of commercial ﬁnancing make alternative sources of income more desirable for
local media outlets; among these, state ﬁnancing is perhaps the easiest to obtain. Table
1 demonstrates the distribution of ﬁnancing sources between the national and regional
levels of the Russian media system in 2016.17 State ﬁnancing of national mass media
includes support for state-owned media companies with all-region coverage, such as
VGTRK, a TV network Russia Today and information agency Rossiya Segodnya (Bryzgalova,
2015). The main form of this type of ﬁnancing is direct subsidies. Regarding regional
media, state ﬁnancing supports local media outlets and comes in diﬀerent forms, the
most popular of which are state informational contracts and direct target subsidies.
A comparison between the sizes of state and commercial ﬁnancing demonstrates that
the majority of income sources are concentrated at the national level (i.e. in Moscow).
Compared to regional media outlets, national media outlets are much more likely to
proﬁt from advertising. A recent study revealed new changes in advertising at the national
level and higher competition for advertising resources due to international sanctions
(Kiriya, 2017). Financing sources are distributed more evenly at the regional level; that
is, state support and advertising income are almost equal (see Table 1).
It is important to note that due to the historical, religious and ethnic backgrounds of its
residents, Russia’s regions are characterized by their diverse cultural identities (Gelman &
Hopf, 2003). These identities inﬂuence how relations between regional authorities and
mass media are structured.18 Therefore, each region may have diﬀering proportions of
state support and advertising income.
In summary, the economic conditions of regional mass media are shaped by two
factors:
(1) Advertising budgets are disproportionally distributed between Moscow and the other
regions. This inequality causes regional media outlets to become more dependent on
alternative forms of ﬁnancial support.
(2) State ﬁnancing plays a key role in Russia’s regional media system, since the proportion
of state ﬁnancing is almost equal to that of advertising expenditures.
Political system
Political systems can be described as systems of interrelated activities that inﬂuence the
way in which authoritative decisions are formulated and executed for a society (Easton,
Table 1. Financing sources at the national and regional levels of the Russian media system in 2016.
Financing sources
Russian mass media
National level (media outlets with
national coverage), bln rubles
Regional level (regional and local
media outlets), bln rubles
State ﬁnancing (e.g. direct and indirect
subsidies, state informational contracts)
80.2 43.2
Advertising 360 45
Sources: AKAR (Association of Communication Agencies of Russia); ARPP (Regional Press Distributors Association).
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1957). However, in the present paper, I only discuss changes in the Russian political system
that concern regional media. The most inﬂuential transformation in regional media pol-
icies occurred in the mid-2000s, when two crucial Federal laws were repealed.
The ﬁrst of these laws19 provided special economic conditions for mass media. Media
outlets were not subject to value-added tax (VAT) and customs duties for operations
related to the production and distribution of media products. Also, media outlets
enjoyed reduced fees for using postal services, sending a telegraph and talking on a tele-
phone, as well as lower-than-market rental rates.
The second law20 aimed to support local press media,21 which was facing the poorest
economic conditions of its history due to disproportions in advertising expenditures.
According to this law, local newspapers would be entitled to ﬁnancial support from the
federal budget for production and development.
However, both of these laws were repealed in August 2004, when law No 121 was intro-
duced and established ‘principles of constitutional state with a socially-oriented market
economy’ (Richter, 2006). This signals an important shift in Russian media policy: regional
mass media outlets are no longer seen by federal authorities as organizations requiring
special economic regimes and institutional protectionism; on the contrary, they are now
considered market actors which, according to neoliberal logic, produce market goods
rather than public goods. After these changes in media policy, Russia became the only
country (among large European countries) that provided neither a privileged economic
regime for mass media nor an institute of public-service media (Richter, 2006).
Public speeches by oﬃcials support the market-oriented view towards regional mass
media. For example, Alexey Volin, the Deputy Minister of Telecom and Mass Communi-
cation, has repeatedly argued for the importance of generating proﬁt rather than
relying on state support (Volin: It is necessary, 2016).
Journalist culture
Toepﬂ (2013) deﬁne journalist culture as ‘the professional norms and wider political and
social beliefs according to which the journalists of a country process information and inter-
pret social reality’ (p. 244). Considering the previous media regimes of Russia, the current
professional norms and political beliefs of Russian journalists working for local media
outlets should be carefully analysed (Pasti & Pietiläinen, 2008; Roudakova, 2017).
In the Soviet Union, journalists perceived themselves to be more than just dissemina-
tors of information. Scholars have described them as creative, independent agents in the
political and social contexts of Russia (Wu, Weaver, & Johnson, 1996) or as ‘co-participants
in the ethico-political enterprise of governing that [which] was Soviet socialism’ (Rouda-
kova, 2009, p. 414). Their role thus included establishing political agendas and developing
the interests of the public. Relations with readers and viewers helped form the image of
Russian mass media as being accountable to its citizens and ‘sustain journalism’s legiti-
macy as “the most humane” institution of Soviet power’ (Roudakova, 2017, p. 51).
Signiﬁcant changes in values occurred among Russian journalists during the ﬁrst half of
the 1990s. Due to political situation, journalists became indistinguishable from politicians
(Pasti & Pietiläinen, 2008) and were treated as ‘weapon[s] to gain political capital’ (Koltsova,
2006). Roudakova (2009) described this period as the ‘privatization’ and fragmentation of
journalism, addressing the collapse of trust in journalism among readers, listeners and
viewers.
RUSSIAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 77
Beginning from the 2000s, relations between the state and local media outlets were
often described as clientelist,22 or close to it (Lowrey & Erzikova, 2010). Pasti and Pietiläinen
(2008) argued that the oppositional role (i.e. criticizing the authorities) of local journalism
has decreased, while ‘a paternalistic relationship to the audience has retained its position’
(p. 128). Erzikova and Lowrey (2014) noticed that, at the regional level, this paternalistic
model is ‘refracted’ in a strange manner. Local authorities tend to empower regional jour-
nalists by bolstering the myth that they are helping underprivileged citizens. This position
is beneﬁcial for local oﬃcials who divert the media from scrutinizing the government too
closely (Erzikova & Lowrey, 2014). Journalists, in turn, interpret their collaboration with the
government as a form of ‘social responsibility – an important aspect of legitimacy – ratio-
nalizing it as a chance to help the disadvantaged’ (Erzikova & Lowrey, 2014, p. 48). Oper-
ating under the clientelist framework, local journalists view public service duty and social
responsibility as crucial to their public and professional legitimacy (Erzikova & Lowrey,
2014).
This paternalistic support of regional journalists resulted in the emergence of state
informational contracts at the beginning of the 2000s. These contracts are typically
made between regional authorities and media outlets to solicit a pre-deﬁned service,
such as media coverage of a particular topic or production of a particular media
product (e.g. a TV series). Such contracts fulﬁll diﬀerent purposes, one of which is
ﬁnancing local media coverage of ‘socially signiﬁcant’ information (Ademukova,
Dovbysh, Kiriya, & Chumakova, 2017).
It is important to note that while this period damaged the relations between journalists
and their patrons, the level of public trust in Russian regional media is still high: 65% of
Russians trust regional and local TV, 44% trust regional and local press, and 36% trust
regional and local radio (WCIOM, 2016).
The combination of being oriented towards public service and having clientelist
relations with authorities creates a bizarre situation. On the one hand, journalists must
perform their professional duties and reinforce their public legitimacy; on the other
hand, they do not want to spoil their relations with their patrons. As a result, journalists
‘pursue ceremonial, skin-deep scrutiny of the oﬃcials; they engage in artiﬁcial forum
“roundtables” with oﬃcials; and they emphasize the publication of many brief stories to
connote progressiveness’ (Lowrey & Erzikova, 2010, p. 275).
The controversial nature of Russia’s regional mass media from the perspective of
local media professionals
In the previous sections, I described how transformations in three interrelated areas have
aﬀected Russia’s regional mass media. However, it may be more important to explore how
these changes have shaped local media professionals’ understanding of the nature of
regional mass media. To achieve this, I conducted 14 semi-structured, in-depth interviews
with both journalists and managers working in media outlets in ﬁve Russian regions,
including the Volga, Siberia, Ural and Far Eastern Federal Districts (see Table 2).
Each interview lasted 40–120 min, with an average length of 70 min, and were all con-
ducted in 2016 and 2017. The interview guide included three blocks of questions. The ﬁrst
block was concerned with the media outlet’s information policies and censorship prac-
tices, as well as its mission and functions. The second block investigated the media
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outlet’s ﬁnancing sources and economic model. The third block included questions on
state informational contracts and the social responsibility of media.
All the respondents, regardless of ownership structure and ﬁnancing sources, stressed
the importance of economic expediency, using such words as ‘proﬁt’, ‘to earn’ and
‘business’ to describe their activities. The necessity of mass media or its components is
deﬁned by the commercial performance of media outlets:
We kept the programmes that let us earn. Our supervisors (parent company – O.D.) clearly
articulated: everything that is not proﬁtable must be closed. (Interview 4)
Non-market funding, such as state informational contracts, is also described using a
‘business’ narrative. The respondents viewed their budgetary funds as commercial
sources of income, since they received the funds as payment for a particular
service. One respondent described changes in the symbolic value of their budgetary
funds:
Table 2. Respondent information.
Interview
# Region Position, gender Media outlet (type, ownership structure)
1 Republic, Volga
Federal District
Chief editor, male Online media. Part of a media holding company and
registered as private. The main shareholders are
regional authorities.
2 Republic, Volga
Federal District
General producer, male Two TV channels (city and regional). The ﬁrst one is a
private company. The second one is jointly owned by a
private company and a holding company, and is
registered as private. The main shareholders are
regional authorities.
3 Republic, Volga
Federal District
Chief editor, male Online media. Private company.
4 Republic, Volga
Federal District
Chief editor, female District newspaper and TV channel. Part of a media
holding company and registered as a JSC. The main
shareholders are regional authorities.
5 Region (Oblast),
Siberia Federal
District
Director, male; general
producer, female
Regional TV channel. Private company. Regional
authorities are among its shareholders.
6 Region (Oblast),
Volga Federal
District
Chief editor, male Regional newspaper. Private company.
7 Region (Oblast),
Volga Federal
District
Chief editor, male Regional TV channel. Private company.
8 Region (Oblast),
Volga Federal
District
Independent journalist,
male
The respondent has contributed to several regional
newspapers.
9 Republic, Far Eastern
Federal District
General director, male Online media. Private company.
10 Republic, Far Eastern
Federal District
Commercial director,
female
Private media holding company. Regional authorities are
among its shareholders.
11 Region (Oblast), Ural
Federal District
Chief editor, male Information agency owned by regional authorities.
12 Region (Oblast), Ural
Federal District
General director, male Private media holding company.
13 Republic, Volga
Federal District
Dean of Journalism
Faculty, male
The respondent is a former deputy general director of a
media holding company, which is registered as private.
The main shareholders are regional authorities.
14 Republic, Volga
Federal District
Deputy general director,
female
Media holding company, registered as private. The main
shareholders are regional authorities.
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We don’t have ‘pure’ budgetary funds; we don’t get them for nothing, by default… For sal-
aries… or for utility bills… <… >. We compete for state contracts, for instance, for one-
year contracts in which a certain number of programmes are ordered. […] Furthermore,
when one receives a contract, the funds are not considered budgetary anymore; it is
payment for a service—the service was ordered and you must provide it. (Interview 5)
For state-owned media, ‘business’ goals can co-exist with the role of mouthpiece for
regional authorities. As mentioned by an owner of a commercial media holding which
works closely with regional authorities:
We are a joint-stock company [JSC], and as a JSC we must be proﬁtable […We are a] state-
owned mass media [outlet] that was formed to speak in plain language about state policies,
government activities [and] the governor’s activities’. (Interview 10)
This bizarre combination of roles is the result of conﬂicting changes in the regional media
system. The national media policy of Russia follows a market-oriented logic, while regional
authorities aim to control the regional media landscape via ﬁnancial instruments or par-
ticipation in media capital.
Another narrative visible in the interviews is what I call ‘public service’. In this narrative,
the respondents highlighted their duties to serve the people and be closer to their readers
or viewers:
[We cover] any complaints, injustices…We are trying to be on the side of ordinary people, to
restore justice [and] to support [them]. (Interview 6)
The idea of being closer to readers suggests that the respondents viewed media outlets as
helpers and problem-solvers for ordinary people. Another respondent reported: ‘We are
open. Many [people] come here [as their] last hope, when nobody else [could] help’ (Inter-
view 4). This concept is close to one of the roles of journalism in the Soviet period: ‘doctors’
who treated the ‘external illnesses’ of social issues without identifying the true causes
(Roudakova, 2009). Similar to its role in the Soviet period, journalism is limited to the
solving of everyday problems; that is, mass media can interfere with social issues, such
as housing and communal services, but it cannot inﬂuence political processes:
Journalists were ‘the fourth power’ about 30 years ago, during the period of Perestroika. But
we still inﬂuence public opinions: we can stop some projects, we can force [the government]
to reconsider the cancellation of dozen of routes [of public transport—O.D.]. (Interview 6)
What is most interesting is how these two narratives co-exist within and constitute the
current role of regional mass media. The commercial narrative seems to have helped
the respondents legitimize the state ﬁnancing model. Viewing themselves as commercial
actors, media outlets pursue proﬁtability as their main goal, which requires the maximiza-
tion of audience size. Such a goal does not imply any social or public-oriented outputs;
thus, external ﬁnancing is needed to implement the public-service functions of media
(e.g. diversity of information, representation of various social groups and communities,
and unproﬁtable yet socially signiﬁcant topics). State informational contracts offered a sol-
ution to eliminate the ‘market failure’ of neglecting socially signiﬁcant information.
One respondent explained that if a commercial TV channel avoided a certain topic that
was not commercially attractive or covered it only brieﬂy, ﬁnancing from state informa-
tional contracts would allow a deeper exploration of the topic:
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This is an issue of shifting emphases and palettes. As I already said, let’s consider TV channel X
(name of the TV channel – O.D.)—this is a purely commercial channel. And let’s consider TV
channel Y (name of another TV channel – O.D.), where we actually have state informational
contracts. This is an issue of, ﬁrst, shifting emphases and priorities, and, second, this is an
issue of, let’s say, depths of investigation on certain topics. I mean, if in the case of a commer-
cial TV channel we focus more on ratings, then in the case of a state contract, we can do more
… (Interview 2)
However, the co-existence of these two narratives has also muddied the role of regional
mass media. The respondents could not deﬁne whether they were market actors or
public servants,23 citing proﬁtability and the necessity of earning money while, at the
same time, stressing the importance of serving public interests. This controversial
nature of regional media outlets is reﬂected in the following quote, which proposes the
idea of serving all stakeholders:
We are balancing the need to please our customers, who pay us good money, to please our
founder [regional authorities – O.D.] and [serve] a third client, our readers. We need to please
them as well. (Interview 10)
Discussion
An analysis of these political, economic and cultural factors reveals the multicausal nature
of transformations in Russia’s regional media system. Poor regional advertising markets,
along with their subordination to national advertising markets, creates a reliance on
state ﬁnancial support. State ﬁnancing has historically been rooted in Russia’s regional
media system, and it is a ﬁnancing model that is anticipated and conﬁrmed by all stake-
holders.24 Moreover, state ﬁnancing is often seen as a better and easier source of income
than advertising revenues. As Ershov (2012) argued, ‘it is easier to deal with one “admin-
istrator of credits” in the backrooms of power than to learn sales techniques, create a
network of advertising agents and compete for advertisers every day’ (p. 178).
Simultaneously, changes in media policy implemented by federal authorities seek to
steer regional media towards commercialization and market-oriented logic. However,
neither during the Soviet period nor the post-Soviet period did regional media outlets
become ﬁnancially independent or act purely on commercial logic.25 Federal media
policy conﬂicts with the intentions of regional authorities who still want to control
media via quasi-economic tools (state informational contracts). As a result, while striving
to be more commercial, regional media is actually becoming more dependent on state
ﬁnancing.
One form of state ﬁnancing, called ‘state informational contracts’, appeared at the
beginning of the 2000s in response to this conﬂict and has since become widespread in
most Russian regions. On the surface, state informational contracts are just another way
to distribute local budgetary funds among media outlets (i.e. a way of controlling local
media through economic leverage); however, their contractual format imitates market
relations, establishing local authorities as ‘clients’ and regional media outlets as ‘suppliers’
of a certain service.
The unique journalist culture of Russia has also had great inﬂuence on its regional
media. During the Soviet period, the central role of journalism was to prioritize citizen-
oriented reporting and actively participate in redressing injustice (with or without
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publishing an article). The post-Soviet period dramatically changed the image of local jour-
nalists, starting from ‘the fourth estate’, moving to ‘the second oldest profession’, then
settling on ‘cynic friends of power’ (Roudakova, 2017). Today, as they are routinely
excluded from any political communication, regional journalists seek ‘safe ground’ of
their professional occupation by helping underprivileged citizens (Lowrey & Erzikova,
2010).
It is quite diﬃcult to categorize these aspirations as pure evidence of the social respon-
sibility of journalism or the public-service function of media. However, the present
research shows that the new economic realities of regional media bring fresh meaning
to the citizen-oriented approach, making it more salient for local media professionals.
Since the main goal of regional media outlets is to achieve proﬁtability, features such as
diversity of information, representation of various groups and communities, and treating
readers or viewers as citizens rather than an audience become less attainable. However,
regional media outlets still perceive themselves as important social institutes for their
local communities, capable of providing help and valuable information to ordinary
people. In this sense, I address the dichotomy of media outlets as market actors and as
public servants. The current trend in regional media towards commercialization poses a
question regarding how the public responsibilities of regional media outlets can be
fulﬁlled in the new media regime.
The present research also demonstrates that state informational contracts, besides
being a tool of control, play a second role: state support of public-oriented content.
This is why a signiﬁcant share of these contracts cover socially signiﬁcant topics
(Dovbysh & Gudova, 2016). In the absence of an institutionalized public-service
model, state authorities follow a paternalistic model based on the ‘duty to protect
and guide’ (Williams, 1976). This means that supervisors or controllers of mass media
aim at not only to maximizing their political power but also making something good
and useful to society.
Today’s regional media system has been shaped by the mismatch between regional
and federal policies as well as by the peculiar journalist culture of Russia. The market-
oriented logic implanted by federal authorities is accompanied by the public-oriented
logic rooted in local journalist culture. These two logics are controversial when fol-
lowed together, as commercial media tends to maximize revenue while public-
service media focuses on service to society. Therefore, regional media outlets
ﬂuctuate between two logics, the boundaries of which are blurred. The interview
responses reported in this paper demonstrate that local media professionals (both
journalists and managers) cannot clearly deﬁne their roles; instead, they cite their
commercial goals and insist on the importance of being proﬁtable, although they
strongly believe in public duty. They are trying to strike a balance between these con-
troversial goals while serving all their ‘beneﬁciaries’. This situation creates quite a legit-
imate and stable model of Russia’s regional media system. The lack of public-oriented
media content is explained by the commercial goals of regional media outlets; at the
same time, the respondents’ aspirations to be helpful to the public suggests the
inevitability of state informational contracts (and other state ﬁnancing models) that
will ﬁx the current ‘market failure’ (i.e. the underrepresentation of socially signiﬁcant
information).
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Conclusion
Through the lens of local media professionals, this paper explored how transformations in
Russia’s political, economic and cultural spheres have formed a controversial yet stable
model of the nation’s regional media. Russia’s contemporary media system is far from
what is considered a normative commercial media model (Toepﬂ, 2013; Vartanova,
2012), and it is also radically diﬀerent from the model of the Soviet period (Becker,
2014); nevertheless, the regional media landscape of today includes elements from
both these regimes. The present research demonstrates what happens whenWestern con-
cepts of commercial media collide with the deeply embedded norms and practices of local
journalism in Russia, such as its roots in state interference and its strong public-oriented
and socially responsible traditions.
Due to the limited number of interviews conducted over the course of this research, I
neither insist that this paper oﬀers a comprehensive explanation of the regional media
landscape in Russia, nor do I deny the existence of regional media outlets which have a
diﬀerent understanding of their positions and roles in Russian society. To better under-
stand the interrelations between macro changes (e.g. political, economic, cultural and
technological) and their inﬂuence on how local media outlets reconsider their professional
norms and values, further research is required.
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Notes
1. Earlier research on Russia’s new media system aimed to assess whether Western (i.e. American
and European) media systems are relevant to the case of Russia (De Smaele, 1999). De Smaele
concluded that some principles of Western media systems were adopted by the Russian
media system; however, several political, economic and cultural peculiarities make the devel-
opment of Russian media quite diﬀerent, such that one can discuss a distinctly ‘Russian’
system. Later research called this system ‘neo-Authoritarian’ (Becker, 2004, 2014), ‘neo-
Soviet’ (Oates, 2007) and ‘state-commercialized’ (Vartanova, 2012).
2. Koltsova (2006) explained ‘cross-institutional groups’ as groups of ﬁnanciers, businesspeople,
state agents and security representatives acting in a private capacity and pooling together
their resources to jointly struggle for and wield power. Kiriya (2012) called them ‘large indus-
trial groups’.
3. The Russian Duma did away with direct gubernatorial elections in 2004.
4. In the public service model, media is non-proﬁt and non-commercial (commercial principles
are not applicable as the primary means to determine the content), aims to maximize the
capability set of broadcasting users and cannot be evaluated only in terms of what audience
buy and enjoy (Garnham, 1999; McChesney, 1999).
5. McQuail (2010) mentioned six characteristics of content to fulﬁll public interest: diversity of
information, opinion and culture; supportive of public order and the law; high quality of
information and culture; supportive of the democratic political system (public sphere),
respectful of international obligations and human rights; avoiding harm to society and
individuals.
6. As of 2018, the Russian Federation includes 85 federal subjects with 6 types: republic, region
(krai), region (oblast), city with federal status, autonomous region (oblast) and autonomous
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region (okrug). Each type diﬀers in legal status. In the present article, I call all federal subjects
of Russia ‘regions’, since their legal statuses are not relevant to this research.
7. Even authors in English-language texts, when writing about Russian media, use the term
‘regional’ rather than ‘local’ (see Erzikova & Lowrey, 2014; Lowrey & Erzikova, 2010; Pasti & Pie-
tiläinen, 2008).
8. It is important to note that digital technologies and the Internet have collapsed the geo-
graphic boundaries of local media. Today, many local news outlets have adopted digital
forms of media and can be assessed from anywhere with an Internet connection. Neverthe-
less, empirical data demonstrates that local media (both historically and currently) continue
to report on local aﬀairs and is oriented towards local citizens and advertisers.
9. ‘Roskomnadzor’ is an abbreviation for the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications,
Information Technology and Mass Media.
10. A media outlet registered in any Russian region can operate on the national level. However, as
a rule, registration within a region indicates regional distribution. Most outlets providing
national mass media are registered in Moscow.
11. These surveys collected general information and did not specify, for example, local or national
issues.
12. Mediascope is the main company that has been certiﬁed to measure and report on statistics in
Russian media. It was formerly known as TNS Gallup Media Russia.
13. In Russia, districts (rayon) include several towns and villages.
14. JSC ‘Tatmedia’ in Tatarstan is the perhaps the best example of this type of media outlet.
15. For instance, the US advertising market was estimated at $206 bln in 2016 (eMarketer, 2017),
$26.91 bln in Germany, $24.87 bln in the UK (Online Marketing Trends, 2017), $8.89 bln in Russia
(eMarketer, 2015). Russia’s regional advertising market was estimated at 45 bln rubles
(approximately $670 mln) (AKAR, 2016).
16. The National Advertising Alliance (NAA) was established in 2016. Its founders include the four
biggest Russian media corporations: Perviy Kanal, VGTRK, Gazprom-Media Holding and
National Media Group. The NAA’s key partner is Region Media, a media company that sells
TV, radio and digital advertising in 27 of Russia’s largest cities. In addition, the company’s auth-
orized partners sell advertising in another 115 Russian cities and towns.
17. Existing data on state and commercial ﬁnancing is generalized; therefore, I could not access
statistics on particular regions or media outlets.
18. For instance, Tatarstan has a strong paternalistic culture, which is reﬂected in the region’s prac-
tices of media control and is supported by political elites. On the contrary, the Tomsk region—
which boasts a high level of human capital due to its many universities and research institutes
—was the last city in Russia with an independent commercial TV channel (i.e. TV2).
19. Federal law No 191, titled ‘On the state support of mass media and book publishing in the
Russian Federation’, was passed in December 1995.
20. Federal law No 177, titled ‘On the economic support of district (city) newspapers’, was passed
in November 1995.
21. Richter (2006) noticed that in 2002, two thirds of the total circulating press in Russia were
regional (local) newspapers, half of which were district and city newspapers.
22. Here, clientelism refers to ‘a form of social and political organization where access to public
resources is controlled by powerful “patrons” and is delivered to less powerful “clients” in
exchange for defense and other forms of service’ (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002, pp.
184–5).
23. This lack of clarity was observed among both the managers (i.e. general directors, producers)
and the content creators (i.e. editors, journalists). In small local media outlets, the positions of
chief editor and general director are generally held by the same person.
24. In the present research, I suggest that stakeholders in the regional media system include
regional media professionals (i.e. journalists and managers), regional authorities, regional
advertisers and the audience.
25. The short period between 1990–1992 may be seen as an exception.
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